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David Demeritt, King’s College London, Department of Geography, Strand, London 
UNITED KINGDOM, WC2R 2LS,  
  
In our technological age, the sciences occupy an increasingly contested and 
contradictory position in environmental politics and policy. Consider the case of 
stratospheric ozone depletion. Here science is at once the means for knowing there is a 
problem and the source of potential solutions to it. At the same time, however, science, 
in the form of CFCs, is also the ultimate cause of the problem in the first place. Ulrich 
Beck is far from alone in seeing a paradox here. In the face of global environmental 
changes that seem to make them "more and more necessary," the sciences are "at the 
same time, less and less sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth” (Beck, 
1992b: 156).  
 This same ambivalence runs through the very heart of political ecology. The field 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s to offer a more critically inflected and social 
scientifically-based diagnosis of environmental change and the conflicts to which it often 
gives rise. In contrast to purely technical analyses of environmental change, political 
ecologists emphasized its “political sources, conditions and ramifications” (Bryant, 1992: 
13). To that end, they critiqued the way that science is often used to naturalize 
inequality and exploitative socio-natural arrangements.  Drawing on currents in 
academic science studies and poststructural theory, they challenged the objectivity of 
science and its epistemic privilege to define what passes for nature (Demeritt 1998).  
This gave political ecologists a very powerful way to critique established socio-
natural arrangements, but it also left their preferred remedies vulnerable to the very 
same maneuver. Thus demands for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have met 
with counter-charges that climate science is too unsettled, socially constructed, and 
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politically tainted to justify any such action (Demeritt 2006). A number of political 
ecologists now worry that the pendulum of constructivist critique has swung too far and 
that there is too much politics and not enough science and ecology in political ecology 
(Walker 2005; Forsyth 2003). The fear is that without some authoritative basis for 
knowing about our environmental problems it will be impossible to devise appropriate 
and publicly acceptable measures to deal with them. This, of course, is the dilemma 
Ulrich Beck identified as the defining feature of an emergent risk society marked by far-
reaching reflexivity and public debate about the grounds for truth and for political 
action.  
One increasingly common response to this challenge is to call for more public 
engagement in science and science-based policy making. The political ecologist Tim 
Forsyth (2011: 44), for instance, recently declared, “environmental science must 
necessarily become more deliberative than commonly practiced… [T]he objectives and 
basic framings used to underpin scientific research will need to be opened to greater 
scrutiny.” Such calls build on a longstanding tradition of participatory research methods 
in political ecology for tapping into so-called traditional ecological knowledge (Horowitz 
this volume), but they are also aligned to some broader claims in human geography and 
political theory about the need to democratize science through public participation and 
deliberation (Brown 2009; Whatmore 2009). Such calls are no longer restricted to the 
ivory towers of academe. From natural resource management to medicine, the rhetoric 
of public engagement, participation and dialogue has become something of a mantra 
across a wide sweep of policy fields that were once the exclusive preserve of scientific 
experts.  
However, as such calls have become more widespread, the reasons for them 
have become more diffuse and poorly defined (Demeritt 2005).  The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to clarify the meaning and purposes of public engagement in science and 
political ecology. In so doing I will try to bring participatory currents in political ecology 
into conversation with a much wider body of work in academic science studies, political 
theory, and policy practice on the promises and perils of participation.  
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Why encourage public participation in science and political ecology? 
Calls for public engagement and participation are underwritten by three distinct, if 
also often intertwined, rationales. First, there are normative arguments about participation 
as a fundamental democratic right (e.g.  Brown 2009; Whatmore 2009). As the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 1998: 102) put it, “Those directly affected by 
an environmental matter should always have an accepted right to make their views known 
before a decision is taken.” Defending this right animates much work in political ecology 
(Peet and Watts 2004). For example, a rich vein of research on nature reserves and 
biodiversity conservation has exposed the continuity of ‘fortress-style’ conservation with 
colonial practices of indigenous dispossession (e.g. Neumann 1998; Peluso 1992). In place of 
often oppressive systems of natural resource management by (and often for) scientific elites, 
political ecologists have promoted community-based resource management as a more just 
alternative (Brosius et al. 2005; Zimmerer 1998). Participation gives local people a voice, and 
so is consistent with procedural ideas of environmental justice as recognition. It is also more 
attuned to local livelihoods and so is arguably also better placed to secure the just outcomes 
emphasized by consequentialist theories of environmental justice (Shrader-Frechette 2002). 
Second, in response to these normative demands for public participation, many 
government agencies are themselves now trying to incorporate more participation by 
the public in their science and science-based policymaking, albeit often for instrumental 
as much as normative reasons. Participation was a mainstay of Agenda 21, which was 
formulated at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (WCED 1987) 
and has since become a central plank for many international conservation initiatives 
(Adams 2001). According to the UK government’s Council for Science and Technology 
(CST 2005: para 11), public engagement offers “a more efficient means of developing 
broadly acceptable policies for issues where the problem of public consent is real, and 
which cannot readily be sidestepped by a quick fix or political sleight of hand”.  
It should be clear what a departure this marks from longstanding traditions of 
technocratic policymaking in which public opposition to any science-based proposals 
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was attributed to public ignorance and a deficit of scientific knowledge (Sturgis and 
Allum 2004). The CST (2005: para 6) now acknowledges that “public concerns can rarely 
be reduced simply to scientific issues”, even as it frames dialogue and public 
engagement as ways of “increasing … public acceptance of specific policy decisions” 
(CST 2005, para 15). As Alan Irwin (2006: 306) has observed, the participatory turn in 
science-based policymaking has sometimes failed to acknowledge how public dialogue 
can “create further grounds for criticism and concern” rather than political consensus. 
While there is now a growing literature in science studies evaluating public engagement 
schemes and offering best practice recommendations (i.e. Chilvers 2009), political 
ecologists have tended to follow Foucault in critiquing these instrumental visions of 
participation as disciplinary mechanisms for molding individuals into self-regulating 
“environmental subjects … for whom the environment constitutes a critical domain of 
thought and action” (Agrawal 2005: 17) In this guise, participation has sometimes been 
condemned as a new tyranny that coopts people into their own subjugation (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). 
Third, normative and instrumental rationales for public participation often find 
common ground in the seductive promise that it will also increase the quality of science and 
science-based policy. For instance, a recent US National Academy of Sciences report 
trumpets the importance of public participation in environmental assessment and decision-
making for “getting the science right” (Dietz and Stern 2008: 50). Likewise, many political 
ecologists also insist that community participation in natural resource management will lead 
to more effective and ecologically sensitive forms of environmental conservation than 
coercive systems of technocratic management by scientific experts (Adams 2001; Brosius et 
al. 2005). 
Such claims about the substantive contributions of public participation to science and 
science-based policy are beset by some fundamental ambiguities. To explore them further, I 
want to return for a moment to Ulrich Beck, both because his theory of reflexive 
modernization is influential in its own right and because it starkly illustrates the ambiguity 
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about the wider claims made in science studies and political ecology about the value and 
purpose of public participation in science and science-based policy. 
Beck (1992a: 119) writes: 
The public sphere, in co-operation with a kind of ‘public science’ 
would be charged as a second centre of ‘discursive checking’ of 
scientific laboratory results.   
While superficially attractive, this vision of the public sphere’s engagement with science begs 
some important questions. What kind of “‘discursive checking’ does Beck hope the public will 
perform in his “upper house”? As I discuss below, Beck’s vision of the substantive 
contributions of public participation can be understood in two quite different ways.  
 
Participation as normative steering  
One way to read Beck‘s vision of participation is as a kind of normative steering of 
science (Figure 1). Here the role for the public upper house would be to apply the normative 
“standard ‘How do we wish to live?’ to scientific plans” (Beck 1992a: 199). In this role, the 
public or political sphere is responsible for regulating the techno-scientific innovation 
undertaken in the lower house of science. This vision depends on already established 
distinctions between the scientific work of discovery and the political work of agreeing on the 
values to regulate its development and application. Conventionally this normative steering 
has come after the fact (Figure 1a), in the form of restrictions on the socially acceptable use 
of technology. As such Beck2 may sound more like a description of the status quo than some 
new, more reflexive modernization, but this apparent contradiction might be resolved if 
Beck2  were read as a call for ‘upstream’ public engagement in science itself (Figure 1b).  
Upstream public engagement was popularized in an influential pamphlet from the 
London think-tank Demos, (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). It called for engagement with the 
public to be moved ‘upstream’ into the heart of the scientific research process where 
research agendas can be shaped and steered in publicly acceptable ways, rather than, as has 
been more typical of ‘downstream’ public consultations, waiting until after the invention of 
new technologies before worrying about how to regulate them. For political ecologists, the 
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idea of upstream public engagement might help to formalize and thereby strengthen the role 
for the public in their otherwise often rather vaguely articulated appeals to participatory 
action research as a research methodology. 
 
Rather than dissolving entirely the distinctions between science and politics, this 
vision of participation as normative steering would make the institutional boundaries 
between them more porous while at the same time preserving the epistemic distinction 
between facts and values. The role for the public would be assessing “the values, visions and 
assumptions that usually lie hidden [i]n the theatre of science and technology” (Wilsdon and 
Willis 2004: 24). Public participation here serves a normative role, steering the direction 
science goes and deciding what goods science should serve, not the epistemic one of judging 
sound science or evaluating the truth of its epistemic claims. This is a reformist, rather than a 
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radical agenda, and it is one that is already coming to fruition, in the form of ethical review 
by institutional review boards and research ethics committees (Dyer and Demeritt 2009), 
various ‘nanodialogues’ and other participatory technology assessments (Chilvers 2009), and 
citizens’ juries and other forms of public engagement in science-based policy making (Dietz 
and Stern 2008), to name just a few.  
Two problems, at once of principle and of practice, plague the ideal of 
participation as normative steering. The first is about representation. How should 
participants be chosen to ensure that their normative judgments reflect those of the 
wider public they serve and represent? It is difficult to scale up from small scale 
deliberative fora, such as the citizen juries conducted in the UK on behalf of the 
Committee for Radioactive Waste Management (Chilvers 2005), to larger scale national 
decisions about where and how to store nuclear waste or whether to commission 
another generation of nuclear reactors. One persistent complaint about public 
engagement exercises is that they fail to represent the views of the ‘silent majority’ 
(Irwin 2006). Similarly political ecologists have noted that participation in community 
resource management schemes is often skewed towards local elites and can reinforce 
existing inequalities based on caste, class, and gender (Agrawal 2005).  But that same 
critique might also be turned inwards on political ecology itself, whose paternalistic 
tradition of radical vanguardism has not always encouraged reflexivity about the effects 
of its own interventions.  
 A second closely related problem is about democratic accountability. How can 
the public license the decisions taken by participants acting in its name but, unlike 
elected officials, not directly accountable to it through the ballot box? In its response to 
the CST (2005) report, the UK government enthusiastically endorsed the CST 
recommendation that the purpose of public dialogues on science “is not to determine 
but to inform policy… Government must retain responsibility for decision-making.” In a 
representative democracy, governments are accountable in ways that focus group 
participants are not. In practice, however, the institutional imperative for participatory 
exercises is often precisely to create enough distance between elected officials and 
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controversial regulatory decisions to allow for blame avoidance and political deniability. 
Rather than confronting this problem of political accountability, participation can serve 
to exacerbate it by adding a new layer of unelected and therefore unaccountable 
representatives from the lay public to already unelected and weakly accountable 
regulatory bodies like the HFEA. Indeed, as Rothstein (2007) notes, it is precisely among 
such unelected and weakly accountable arms of the regulatory state where the 
enthusiasm for public engagement has been greatest. Likewise in a development 
context, critics of the participatory turn worry that it tends to reinforce rather than 
resist hegemonic power (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
But as I have already noted, there is another, much more radical way to 
understand the substantive contributions of public engagement in science and science-
based policymaking. 
Participation as epistemic checking 
Public participation can also be understood as offering an epistemic challenge to 
scientific authority (Figure 2). For instance, Beck writes: 
Only a strong competent public debate, ‘armed’ with scientific 
arguments, is capable of separating the scientific wheat from the 
chaff (1992a: 119).   
Read in this context, Beck’s (1992a: 119) claim about the role of the public sphere “as a 
second centre of ‘discursive checking’ of scientific laboratory results” can be understood as a 
truth determining one. Here the role for the public would be to double-check the factual 
claims made by the lower house of science. This amounts to a conventionalist theory of 
truth, in which, after (Rorty 1991, 23), science is understood as a form of solidarity and rather 
than a method of objective inquiry, and “’truth’ is simply a compliment paid to the beliefs we 
think so well justified that for the moment further justification is not needed.” In such a 
world, scientific debate flows seamlessly into political debate. Indeed, the difference 
between them fades away altogether as epistemological and institutional divides between 
science and politics, facts and values, are dissolved within an enlarged and invigorated public 
sphere (Figure 2a).  
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Beck, of course, is far from alone here in arguing that the boundaries between 
science and politics have been irreparably breached. This is a central theme for a 
generation of academic science studies (cf. Demeritt 1996) and of post-structural 
political ecology. Escobar (1998: 54-55), for example, rejected the idea that biodiversity 
is “a true object that science progressively uncovers” insisting instead that it is a social 
“construct around which a complex discourse of nature is being deployed…. [to] anchor 
an entire apparatus for the dispersion of new truths throughout vast social domains.” 
However, critics (i.e. Forsyth 2003) worry that constructivists leave political ecology with 
no way to distinguish warranted belief from mere opinion: debate about environmental 
degradation can always be extended by dissenters, however ignorant, ill-informed, or 
duplicitous their claims.  
Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002) call this the ‘problem of extension’, and 
climate change provides a good example of the difficulties it creates. Notwithstanding 
the robust scientific consensus to the contrary, a host of conservative think tanks and 
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industry-funded political action committees have spent millions in a slick public relations 
campaign to deny the risks posed by rising concentrations of greenhouse gases from 
fossil fuel consumption (Demeritt 2006; cf. Liverman this volume). Pointing specifically 
to such special interest organized skepticism, Collins and Evans (2002: 280) ask: 
 do we never want to say that the tobacco industry has for years 
falsified … epidemiological studies out of a concern for selling more 
cigarettes? Do we want to say, rather, that this was just [their] 
point of view and that the only fight there is to be had with them is 
a political fight, not a scientific fight?  
To solve this problem of extension, Collins and Evans offer a more carefully 
differentiated definition of expertise, emphasizing experience rather than formal scientific 
qualifications, as the basis for warranting knowledge claims (Figure 2b). Their approach to 
expertise provides a basis for some public involvement in epistemic checking of scientific 
claims by valorizing the knowledge of uncertified specialists from among what had been 
previously regarded as a uniformly ignorant and unqualified lay public.  At the same time 
Collins and Evans also insist that having a PhD in one specialist area does not qualify you as 
an expert in others. As a result the line in Figure 2b demarcating an expert-scientific realm 
from a public-political one is jagged to take in “the odd-shaped pockets of expertise found 
among the lay public” (251) and exclude scientists not possessing the particular expertise 
necessary to answer the scientific question at hand.  
Their idea of uncertified expertise provides one justification for the claim, now 
widespread in political ecology and science studies, that “public engagement can be 
essential for ‘getting the science right’” (Dietz and Stern 2008: 50). In political ecology,  
participatory mapping and GIS are now firmly established (Bryan this volume), building 
on traditions of participatory rural appraisal for involving poor, often marginalized and 
non-literate groups as co-equal partners in development planning (Chambers 1994). 
Similar participatory approaches are now being developed to engage non-scientists in 
the design, testing, and validation of computer simulation models that are so important 
for many areas of environmental science and policy (e.g. Lane et al. 2011; Millington et 
al 2011). Public engagement methods are an important addition to the political ecology 
toolbox of techniques for exploring the integration of nature and society (Zimmerer this 
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volume), but political ecologists have not always been as clear as Collins and Evans 
about what, how, and why public participation might be expected to contribute to 
science and science-based policy or to political ecology studies of them.  
There are at least two distinct ways in which participation might make 
substantive, epistemic contributions to steer science and political ecology. First, 
members of the public might serve as sources of scientific data and thereby contribute 
to empirical discovery. Though the spatial imaginary of so-called ‘traditional ecological 
knowledge’ typically locates it in less developed parts of the world (cf. Agrawal 1995), in 
both the US and Europe there have been efforts to enroll the expertise of amateur 
naturalists in measuring wildlife populations through programmes such as the Great 
Backyard Bird Count (Toogood 2013). Similarly user-generated data from flood victims is 
also being used to improve the measurement of extreme flood events, which are 
otherwise hard for scientists to measure (Demeritt and Nobert 2014; Lane et al. 2011; 
Parkes et al. 2013). Political ecologists have long celebrated the validity and value of 
traditional ecological knowledge (Horowitz this volume), but their embrace of 
participation has also been motivated by the emancipatory desire to move away from 
extractive relationships to ones of co-production in which research subjects are treated 
as partners and involved not just in generating data but also in deciding what counts as 
true and valid.  
This points to a second way in the public might contribute to what Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1992) call ‘extended peer review’. Particularly for ‘post-normal’ problems 
“where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (744), 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992) insist that “public agreement and participation, deriving 
essentially from value commitments, will be decisive for the assessment of risks and the 
setting of policy” (751). In a similar way political ecologists have often championed the 
potential for such ‘citizen science’ (Irwin 1995) to challenge the hegemony of expert 
claims about environmental problems such as deforestation (Fairhead and Leach 1996), 
hydraulic fracturing (Willow and Wylie 2014), and flooding (Whatmore 2009). 
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 However, such claims about the substantive, epistemic contributions of public 
participation are beset by ambiguities about which members of the public might be qualified 
to make such contributions and on what basis. For instance Chambers (1994: 954) insists that 
“poor and exploited people can and should be enabled to conduct their own analysis of their 
own reality.” In so doing he conflates a normative plea for participation as a fundamental 
democratic right with an epistemological claim that participatory methods involving such 
marginalized groups “come out better by criteria of cost-effectiveness, validity, and reliability 
… compared with conventional methods” of expert-led science (956). These different aims 
imply different kinds of participation from differently defined constituencies.  
Participation as democratic right would imply unrestricted participation by any 
member of the relevant political constituency. While there are important questions about 
how that constituency should be defined in any given case, it is clear that if participation is a 
right, then participation rests on identity and political standing, rather than possession of any 
substantive knowledge or experience beyond membership of the political community itself. 
But if this is the case, then how can universal participation avoid the problem of extension 
identified by Collins and Evans (2002)? Chambers provides no explicit answer. His reference 
to the poor having “their own reality” somehow different from that of “outsiders” whose 
“reality [often] blanketed that of local people” (963) hints at a post-structuralist sensibility 
that would regard the resolution of scientific disputes about knowledge as essentially and 
ultimately a question of power rather than of logical proof or independent empirical 
validation. While that anti-foundational instinct is something of a commonplace now in 
political ecology, it belies the more conventional truth claims Chambers makes elsewhere 
about participation contributing substantively to the epistemic checking of science and 
science-based policy. Here the claim is not about power effects, but about facts and truth, 
defined in rather conventional, naturalist terms.   
This, in turn, would depend upon restricting participation to those with relevant 
knowledge to contribute. Such knowledge might be place-based, derived from traditional 
knowledge of some particular environment or process, or practical, emerging from first-hand 
experience of the environment. There are also hints here of a standpoint epistemology 
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whereby marginality itself is imagined as the only valid basis for understanding 
marginalization (Demeritt 1996). Whatever its precise basis, participation in epistemic 
checking would seem to depend on knowledge and as such should be restricted to experts, 
whether certified or otherwise, actually possessing some relevant knowledge to contribute. 
Of course deciding what knowledge is relevant and thus who might be qualified to contribute 
to epistemic checking is contestable, but that is a political decision, and as such is, in principle 
at least, distinct from questions of truth and scientific validity, where participation is 
restricted to those with knowledge. This is very different to the universal participation in 
normative steering, which depends on identity and political status rather than knowledge.  
 
Conclusion 
Like the fields of environmental science and policy with which it is in critical 
conversation, political ecology has taken a participatory turn of late, but without always 
articulating the reasons for that move or the implications that follow from it. Thus, the 
aim of this chapter has been to clarify the various competing rationales for embracing 
public participation in science and political ecology. In particular, I showed how 
normative claims for participation as some kind of basic right of those affected sit 
uncomfortably alongside other more instrumental and substantive claims that public 
participation will also somehow increase the quality and legitimacy of scientific 
knowledge and of the policy decisions informed by that knowledge. These different 
rationales are in marked tension with one another. They imply engaging in different 
ways with differently constituted publics to different ends. Sharper distinctions are 
required here because without them the tendency will be both for the promises of 
participation to be oversold and for public engagement plans to be ill-suited to the 
specific contexts and contributions for which they are intended.  
To that end, I distinguished two very different ways in which public participation 
might contribute substantively to science and science-based policy, which I termed 
normative steering and epistemic checking. Whereas the former promises to provide the 
moral compass needed to steer their development in democratically legitimate ways (and as 
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such is continuous with some normative claims for participation as democratic right), the 
latter contributes new information and quality assurance procedures to ensure their truth 
and reliability and as such is restricted to those possessing relevant knowledge to contribute.  
Arguably this is much too tidy a distinction. After all, political ecology was founded on 
the recognition that distinctions between science and politics are not self-evident and 
ontologically given but precariously and problematically made (Lave this volume). It was that 
realization that science already reflects certain tacit political values and power structures 
that gave rise to calls for participation as a way of challenging them.   
However, those critiques are doomed to fail without greater clarity about the 
different kinds of public warrant involved in making different sorts of political ecology 
critique. Normative critiques of science and of the injustice of particular environmental 
policies are properly political questions for the public in general. Political ecologists have 
often been quick to unveil the values underpinning the science-based claims of others, but 
they have not always been terribly reflexive about whether their own research programmes 
meet with the approval of the people in whose name they are acting (see Sundberg, this 
volume). Political ecology’s paternalistic tradition of radical vanguardism tends to close off 
the sorts of questions about the purposes, framing, and funding of political ecology research, 
which the idea of normative steering is supposed to open up to wider public scrutiny. 
Political ecologists have typically treated representativeness as an epistemological question 
about how truthfully they are reflecting the views and values of those they study, rather than 
a political one about their own accountability to the publics they purport to speak for and to. 
While institutional review boards and ethical review ensure the accountability of political 
ecology to a universalized coda of research ethics based on liberal ideas of individual 
informed consent (Holden and Demeritt 2008), upstream public engagement provides a way 
to formalize often vague claims about participatory action research methodologies by giving 
those involved a mechanism for playing a more active role in framing the aims and methods 
of political ecology. Opening up political ecology to normative steering by the public would 
thus involve relinquishing some of the autonomy and academic freedom traditionally 
enjoyed by academic researchers, but it might also provide new opportunities to articulate 
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the wider public purposes of political ecology and in the process, perhaps, expand the 
breadth and depth of its public appreciation.  
Opening up the substantive factual claims of political ecology to participatory 
challenge is potentially even more radical. In its very strongest form, it would dissolve any 
epistemic or institutional distinction between scientists and citizens into a vastly expanded 
public debate in which science carries no special epistemic status and extended public 
participation is required because truth is a matter of convention, determined through 
persuasion, popularity, and power, rather than by expert judgments about its 
correspondence to the independent reality it purports to represent. While the claims of post-
structural political ecologists like Escobar (1998) about undecidability and the social 
construction of knowledge and nature can certainly be read in this very radical neo-Kantian 
way (Demeritt 1998), it is noteworthy that they are typically  rendered in a fairly 
conventional register, with direct quotations, footnotes, and the whole architecture of 
academic referencing offering themselves up for evaluation not as imaginary, but realistic 
worlds, in the fashion of fiction, but rather as actual worlds, faithfully represented. Seen in 
this light it may be that some of the concerns about relativism are overblown and that 
poststructuralists are not nearly as radical as they claim to be. Nevertheless, for many 
political ecologists, this radical version of public participation as epistemic checking strays too 
close to relativism. They worry that the field needs some foundation for warranting belief 
and preventing the extension of debate by dissenters, however ignorant, ill-informed, or 
duplicitous their claims. While they embrace the potential for uncertified experts to use their 
experiential or traditional knowledge to contribute to political ecology, they limit such 
participation to those possessing some relevant to knowledge to contribute. This more 
modest vision of public participation as epistemic checking challenges the monopoly of 
experts on epistemic authority, but it is does not challenge the traditional grounds for 
evaluating the truth of those claims. 
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